Select the category of case law.

During an argument with his wife, petitioner Edward Caniglia placed a handgun on the dining room table and asked his wife to "shoot [him] and get it over with." His wife instead left the home and spent the night at a hotel.  The next morning, she was unable to reach her husband by phone, so she called the police to request a welfare check. The responding officers accompanied Caniglia's wife to the home, where they encountered Caniglia on the porch. The officers called an ambu- lance based on the belief that Caniglia posed a risk to himself or others.  Caniglia agreed to go to the hospital for a psychiatric evaluation on the condition that the officers not confiscate his firearms. But once Caniglia left, the officers located and seized his weapons.  Caniglia sued, claiming that the officers had entered his home and seized him and his firearms without a warrant in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The District Court granted summary judgment to the officers.  The First Circuit affirmed, extrapolating from the Court's decision in Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 433, a theory that the officers' removal of Caniglia and his firearms from his home was justified by a "community caretaking exception" to the warrant requirement.   

Held: Neither the holding nor logic of Cady justifies such warrantless searches and seizures in the home.  Cady held that a warrantless search of an impounded vehicle for an unsecured firearm did not violate the Fourth Amendment.  In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that the officers who patrol the "public highways" are often called to discharge noncriminal "community caretaking functions," such as responding to disabled vehicles or investigating accidents.  413 U. S., at 441. But searches of vehicles and homes are constitutionally different, as the Cady opinion repeatedly stressed.  Id., at 439, 440– 442. The very core of the Fourth Amendment's guarantee is the right of a person to retreat into his or her home and "there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion."  Florida v. Jardines, 569 U. S. 1, 6. A recognition of the existence of "community caretaking" tasks, like rendering aid to motorists in disabled vehicles, is not an open-ended license to perform them anywhere.  Pp. 3–4.

953 F. 3d 112, vacated and remanded.

THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.  ROBERTS, C. J., filed a concurring opinion, in which B REYER, J., joined.  A LITO, J.,   and KAVANAUGH, J., filed concurring opinions.  

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________
No. 20–157
_________________
EDWARD A. CANIGLIA, PETITIONER v.  ROBERT F. STROM, ET AL          .
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT  
[May 17, 2021]
JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

Decades ago, this Court held that a warrantless search of an impounded vehicle for an unsecured firearm did not violate the Fourth Amendment.  Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 433 (1973).  In reaching this conclusion, the Court observed that police officers who patrol the "public highways" are often called to discharge noncriminal "community caretaking functions," such as responding to disabled vehicles or investigating accidents.  Id., at 441. The question today is whether Cady's acknowledgment of these "caretaking" duties creates a standalone doctrine that justifies warrantless searches and seizures in the home. It does not.

I
During an argument with his wife at their Rhode Island home, Edward Caniglia (petitioner) retrieved a handgun from the bedroom, put it on the dining room table, and asked his wife to "shoot [him] now and get it over with."  She declined, and instead left to spend the night at a hotel.  The next morning, when petitioner's wife discovered that she could not reach him by telephone, she called the police (respondents) to request a welfare check.

Respondents accompanied petitioner's wife to the home, where they encountered petitioner on the porch. Petitioner spoke with respondents and confirmed his wife's account of the argument, but denied that he was suicidal. Respondents, however, thought that petitioner posed a risk to himself or others.  They called an ambulance, and petitioner agreed to go to the hospital for a psychiatric evaluation— but only after respondents allegedly promised not to confiscate his firearms. Once the ambulance had taken petitioner away, however, respondents seized the weapons.  Guided by petitioner's wife—whom they allegedly misinformed about his wishes—respondents entered the home and took two handguns.

Petitioner sued, claiming that respondents violated the Fourth Amendment when they entered his home and seized him and his firearms without a warrant.  The District Court granted summary judgment to respondents, and the First Circuit affirmed solely on the ground that the decision to remove petitioner and his firearms from the premises fell within a "community caretaking exception" to the warrant requirement.  953 F. 3d 112, 121–123, 131 and nn. 5, 9 (2020). Citing this Court's statement in Cady that police officers often have noncriminal reasons to interact with motorists on "public highways," 413 U. S., at 441, the First Circuit extrapolated a freestanding community-caretaking exception that applies to both cars and homes. 953 F. 3d, at  124 ("Threats to individual and community safety are not confined to the highways").  Accordingly, the First Circuit saw no need to consider whether anyone had consented to respondents' actions; whether these actions were justified by "exigent circumstances"; or whether any state law permitted this kind of mental-health intervention. Id., at 122– 123. All that mattered was that respondents' efforts to protect petitioner and those around him were "distinct from 'the normal work of criminal investigation,'" fell "within the  realm of reason," and generally tracked what the court viewed to be "sound police procedure."  Id., at 123–128, 132– 133. We granted certiorari. 592 U. S. ___ (2020).

II
The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures."  The "'very  core'" of this guarantee is "'the right of a man to retreat into                 his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.'"  Florida v. Jardines, 569 U. S. 1, 6 (2013).

To be sure, the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit all unwelcome intrusions "on private property," ibid.—only "unreasonable" ones. We have thus recognized a few permissible invasions of the home and its curtilage.  Perhaps most familiar, for example, are searches and seizures pursuant to a valid warrant.  See Collins v. Virginia, 584 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2018) (slip op., at 5–6). We have also held that law enforcement officers may enter private property without a warrant when certain exigent circumstances exist, including the need to "'render emergency assistance to an in- jured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury.'"   Kentucky v. King, 563 U. S. 452, 460, 470 (2011); see also Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U. S. 398, 403–404 (2006) (listing other examples of exigent circumstances). 

And, of course, officers may generally take actions that "'any private citizen might do'" without fear of liability. E.g., Jardines, 569 U. S., at 8 (approaching a home and knocking on the front door).

The First Circuit's "community caretaking" rule, however, goes beyond anything this Court has recognized. The decision below assumed that respondents lacked a warrant or consent, and it expressly disclaimed the possibility that they were reacting to a crime.  The court also declined to consider whether any recognized exigent circumstances were present because respondents had forfeited the point.  

Nor did it find that respondents' actions were akin to what a private citizen might have had authority to do if petitioner's wife had approached a neighbor for assistance instead of the police.
Neither the holding nor logic of Cady justified that approach. True, Cady also involved a warrantless search for a firearm. But the location of that search was an impounded vehicle—not a home—"'a constitutional differ- ence'" that the opinion repeatedly stressed.  413 U. S., at  439; see also id., at 440–442. In fact, Cady expressly contrasted its treatment of a vehicle already under police control with a search of a car "parked adjacent to the dwelling place of the owner." Id., at 446–448 (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971)).

Cady's unmistakable distinction between vehicles and homes also places into proper context its reference to "community caretaking."  This quote comes from a portion of the opinion explaining that the "frequency with which . . . vehicle[s] can become disabled or involved in . . . accident[s] on public highways" often requires police to perform noncriminal "community caretaking functions," such as providing aid to motorists. 413 U. S., at 441.  But, this recognition that police officers perform many civic tasks in modern society was just that—a recognition that these tasks exist, and not an open-ended license to perform them anywhere.

*        *       *

What is reasonable for vehicles is different from what is reasonable for homes.  Cady acknowledged as much, and this Court has repeatedly "declined to expand the scope of . . . exceptions to the warrant requirement to permit warrantless entry into the home."  Collins, 584 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 8). We thus vacate the judgment below and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________
No. 20–157
_________________
EDWARD A. CANIGLIA, PETITIONER v.  ROBERT F. STROM, ET AL          .
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT  
[May 17, 2021]
JUSTICE KAVANAUGH, concurring.

I join the Court's opinion in full. I write separately to underscore and elaborate on THE CHIEF JUSTICE's point that the Court's decision does not prevent police officers from taking reasonable steps to assist those who are inside a home and in need of aid.  See ante, at 1 (ROBERTS, C. J.,  concurring).  For example, as I will explain, police officers may enter a home without a warrant in circumstances where they are reasonably trying to prevent a potential suicide or to help an elderly person who has been out of contact and may have fallen and suffered a serious injury.  Ratified in 1791 and made applicable to the States in 1868, the Fourth Amendment protects the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures."  As the constitutional text establishes, the "ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness."  Riley v. California, 573 U. S. 373, 381 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court has said that a warrant supported by probable cause is ordinarily required for law enforcement officers to enter a home.  See U. S. Const., Amdt. 4.  But drawing on common-law analogies and a commonsense appraisal of what is "reasonable," the Court has recognized various situations where a warrant is not required.  For example, the exigent circumstances doctrine allows officers to enter a
home without a warrant in certain situations, including: to fight a fire and investigate its cause; to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence; to engage in hot pursuit of a fleeing felon or prevent a suspect's escape; to address a threat to the safety of law enforcement officers or the general public; to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant; or to protect an occupant who is threatened with serious injury.  See Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 588 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (plurality opinion) (slip op., at 6); City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U. S. 600, 612 (2015); Kentucky v. King, 563 U. S. 452, 460, 462 (2011); Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U. S. 45, 47 (2009) (per curiam); Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U. S. 398, 403 (2006); Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U. S. 91, 100 (1990); Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U. S. 287, 293, and n. 4 (1984) (plurality opinion); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385, 392–394 (1978); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499, 509–510 (1978); United States v. Santana, 427 U. S. 38, 42–43 (1976); Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294, 298–299 (1967); Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23, 40–41 (1963) (plurality opinion).

Over the years, many courts, like the First Circuit in this case, have relied on what they have labeled a "community caretaking" doctrine to allow warrantless entries into the home for a non-investigatory purpose, such as to prevent a suicide or to conduct a welfare check on an older individual who has been out of contact. But as the Court today explains, any such standalone community caretaking doctrine was primarily devised for searches of cars, not homes.  Ante, at 3–4; see Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 433, 447–448 (1973).

That said, this Fourth Amendment issue is more labeling than substance. The Court's Fourth Amendment case law already recognizes the exigent circumstances doctrine, which allows an officer to enter a home without a warrant if the "exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment."  Brigham City, 547 U. S., at 403 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also ante, at 3. As relevant here, one such recognized "exigency" is the "need to assist persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such injury." Brigham City, 547 U. S., at 403; see also ante, at 1 (ROBERTS, C. J.,  concurring).  The Fourth Amendment allows officers to enter a home if they have "an objectively reasonable basis for believing" that such help is needed, and if the officers' actions inside the home are reasonable under the circumstances. Brigham City, 547 U. S., at 406; see also Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U. S., at 47–48.

This case does not require us to explore all the contours of the exigent circumstances doctrine as applied to emergency-aid situations because the officers here disclaimed reliance on that doctrine.  But to avoid any confusion going forward, I think it important to briefly describe how the doctrine applies to some heartland emergency-aid situations.  As Chief Judge Livingston has cogently explained, although this doctrinal area does not draw much attention from courts or scholars, "municipal police spend a good deal of time responding to calls about missing persons, sick neighbors, and premises left open at night."  Livingston, Police, Community Caretaking, and the Fourth Amendment, 1998 U. Chi. Leg. Forum 261, 263 (1998).  And as she aptly noted, "the responsibility of police officers to search for missing persons, to mediate disputes, and to aid the ill or injured has never been the subject of serious debate; nor has" the "responsibility of police to provide services in an emergency." Id., at 302.

Consistent with that reality, the Court's exigency precedents, as I read them, permit warrantless entries when police officers have an objectively reasonable basis to believe that there is a current, ongoing crisis for which it is reasonable to act now. See, e.g., Sheehan, 575 U. S., at 612; Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U. S., at 48–49; Brigham City, 547 U. S., at 406–407. The officers do not need to show that the harm has already occurred or is mere moments away, because knowing that will often be difficult if not impossible in cases involving, for example, a person who is currently suicidal or an elderly person who has been out of contact and may have fallen.  If someone is at risk of serious harm and it is reasonable for officers to intervene now, that is enough for the officers to enter.

A few (non-exhaustive) examples illustrate the point.  Suppose that a woman calls a healthcare hotline or 911 and says that she is contemplating suicide, that she has firearms in her home, and that she might as well die. The operator alerts the police, and two officers respond by driving to the woman's home.  They knock on the door but do not receive a response.  May the officers enter the home?  Of course.

The exigent circumstances doctrine applies because the officers have an "objectively reasonable basis" for believing that an occupant is "seriously injured or threatened with such injury."  Id., at 400, 403; cf. Sheehan, 575 U. S., at 612 (officers could enter the room of a mentally ill person who had locked herself inside with a knife).  After all, a suicidal individual in such a scenario could kill herself at any moment. The Fourth Amendment does not require officers to stand idly outside as the suicide takes place.⁶   Consider another example. Suppose that an elderly man is uncharacteristically absent from Sunday church services and repeatedly fails to answer his phone throughout the day and night. A concerned relative calls the police and asks the officers to perform a wellness check. Two officers drive to the man's home.  They knock but receive no response. May the officers enter the home? Of course.  Again, the officers have an "objectively reasonable basis" for believing that an occupant is "seriously injured or threatened with such injury." Brigham City, 547 U. S., at 400, 403. Among other possibilities, the elderly man may have fallen and hurt himself, a common cause of death or serious injury for older individuals.  The Fourth Amendment does not prevent the officers from entering the home and checking on the man's well-being.⁷  
To be sure, courts, police departments, and police officers alike must take care that officers' actions in those kinds of cases are reasonable under the circumstances.  But both of those examples and others as well, such as cases involving unattended young children inside a home, illustrate the kinds of warrantless entries that are perfectly constitutional under the exigent circumstances doctrine, in my view.
With those observations, I join the Court's opinion in full.
——————