Click on the case titles to link to the full case decision.
Silverman v. US, 365 U.S. 505 (1961)-Officers entered the attached residence next to the petitioner. The officers pushed a listening devise into the petitioner's residence until it contacted the the air ducts. The devise allowed the officers to listen to conversations in the petitioner's residence. The officers violated the petitioner's Fourth Amendment rights because the officers did not obtain a warrant.
Lopez v. US, 373 US 427 (1963)-An undercover officer can use a hidden tape recorder. The recorder was used to obtain the most reliable evidence of the conversation between the officer and the suspect.
Berger v. New York, 388 U. S. 41 (1967)-New York's eavesdropping law did not:
- Particularly describe an offense that has or is being committed.
- Particularly describe the conversations, sought.
- The statute did not place a termination date once the sought after conversation is obtained.
The broadness of the statute violated the Fourth Amendment.
Katz v. United States, 389 US 347(1967)-Earlier rulings from the court, particularly the Olmstead case, said that the government can eavesdrop on constitutionally protected areas without a warrant as long as the government does not physically penetrate the areas to accomplish the eavesdrop. The court stated in the Katz case the following: "We conclude that the underpinnings of Olmstead (Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438) and Goldman (Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129) have been so eroded by our subsequent decisions that the "trespass" doctrine there enunciated can no longer be regarded as controlling. The Government's activities in electronically listening to and recording the petitioner's words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a "search and seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The fact that the electronic device employed to achieve that end did not happen to penetrate the wall of the booth can have no constitutional significance. "
US v. US District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972)-The President's Constitutional powers to protect the country do not allow the circumvention of the Fourth Amendment requirement of judicial approval of wiretaps. This applies to domestic security cases.
Dalia v. US, 441 US 238 (1979)-The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit a covert entry to install electronic listening devices. The court approving the warrant does not have to explicitly authorize the covert entry to install the equipment.
Smith v. Maryland, 442 US 735 (1979)-The use of a pen register that records only phone numbers does not constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983)-A beeper was placed into a can of chloroform with the consent of the then-owner. The can was turned over to Knotts and he placed it in his vehicle. The vehicle drove only in public areas. The use of a tracking devise on an automobile traveling on public roadways is neither a "search" nor "seizure" and a warrant is not required.
US v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984)-A tracking devise hid inside an object cannot be used to reveal information about the inside of a residence without a warrant.
US v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850 (5th Cir. 1995)-The use of a thermal imager in an open field does not offend the Fourth Amendment.
US v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994 (7th Cir. 2007)-The GPS tracking of a suspect's vehicle is not a search and does not need a warrant.
US v. Bucci, 582 F.3d 108 (1st Cir. 2009)-Police placed a pole camera across the street from Bucci’s house. The camera was pointed on the front of Bucci’s house including his garage. Bucci sued claiming a Fourth Amendment violation by the police for conducting almost constant surveillance of his residence with the camera. The Court held that Bucci had no expectation of privacy in the areas he exposes to public view. There was no violation.
US v. Pineda–Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1217 (9th Cir. 2010)-A person does not have an expectation of privacy in their unsecured driveway. It is not a 4th Amendment violation to enter onto this part of the curtilage and afix a GPS tracking device to a vehicle.
Glik v. Cunniffe, 10-1764 (1st Cir 2011)-Massachusetts had a wiretap law that forbad the secret audio recording of another person. Glik was in plain view in Boston Common using his cell phone to video and audio record police officers using force against a subject during an arrest. One of the officers arrested Glik for violating the Massachusetts wiretap law. The court held, “Such peaceful recording of an arrest in a public space that does not interfere with the police officers’ performance of their duties is not reasonably subject to limitation.” Glik was openly showing his phone as he recorded. His actions were lawful and his arrest was a violation of his rights.
US v. Jones, ____ US 10–1259 (2012)-Held: "The Government’s attachment of the GPS device to the vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements, constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment." This case differs from Knotts in that the government intruded onto Jone's vehicle and hid a GPS tracking device. This device enabled the government to track in detail every movement of the vehicle, even into private areas.
US v. Graham, No. 12-4659 (4th Cir 2016)-The defendants were being investigated for a series of armed robberies. The Government obtained the historical cell-site location information from the defendants' cell phone provider without a warrant. This information provided the location of the cell tower (usually the nearest) that transmitted a signal when the defendants used their cell phones. The information was used to place the defendants in the areas of the robberies when they occurred. The Court held that individuals have no expectation of privacy in information shared with third-parties (in this case the cell phone provider receiving information on the tower location). There is no Fourth Amendment violation.
US v. Cantu, No. 16-2191 (10th Cir. 2017)-Law Enforcement placed a utility pole camera near Cantu's home. They saw him outside his home carrying an assault rifle. He is a convicted felon. The agent's served a search warrant for the rifle. They found the rifle and arrested Cantu. Cantu tried to suppress the evidence because of the use of the camera. The court held that the use of a pole camera that could not see inside the home and could only see what a passerby could see was lawful.
Carpenter v. US, No. 16-402 (SCOTUS 2018)-The FBI ’s acquisition of Carpenter’s cell-site records was a Fourth Amendment search. The FBI was required to obtain a search warrant to get the cell-site location information from the phone company.
Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle v. Baltimore Police Dept., No. 20-1495 (4th Cir 2020)-Baltimore PD has an air surveillance program where planes fly over Baltimore and take photographs. The Police Department uses the photographs to help in violent crime investigations. The Plaintiffs sued claiming that the police can use the photos to track them as they engage in community activism. The Court held that the program did not violate their Constitutional rights.
US v. Rickmon, No. 19-2054 (7 Cir. 2020)-ShotSpotter is a surveillance network of GPS-enabled acoustic sensors used to identify, triangulate, and direct officers to the location of gunfire. ShotSpotter detected gunfire and police were sent to the area. The first officer on scene spotted a vehicle leaving the area. He stopped the vehicle. The passenger, Rickmon was arrested for being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm. Rickmon appealed claiming that that ShotSpotter information was inaccurate and unreliable. The information from it was insufficient to justify his vehicle being stopped. The District and Circuit Courts held that the totality of the circumstances made the traffic stop lawful.
US v. Dewilfond, No. 22-1066 (8th Cir. 2022)-Dewilfond conditionally pled guilty to distribution of CDS and possession of ammunition after a felony conviction. He appealed his conviction based on the warrantless collection of GPS locational data. The data was from a vehicle being tracked with the owner's consent prior to Dewilfond borrowing the vehicle. The owner of the vehicle was a confidential informant and had tipped the police that Dewilfond wanted to borrow his vehicle to distribute a large about of methamphetamine. With the CI's permission, the police placed a GPS tracker on the vehicle. The CI let Dewilfond borrow the vehicle. The police tracked it for two days before arresting Dewilfond from it. Dewilfond was arrested with over 1000 grams of methamphetamine. Dewilfond made a motion to suppress his Miranda statements and evidence based on the GPS tracking of the vehicle. The district court denied the motion. He appealed. The 8th Circuit court held: A. Dewilfond had no property interest or expectation of privacy in the vehicle when the CI gave consent to monitor the vehicle with a GPS tracker. B. The police had reason to believe the vehicle was used to distribute illegal drugs. The vehicle was tracked in public places, and the GPS did not allow officers to peer into the intricacies of Dewilfond's private life. The denial of the motion was affirmed.